While in the process of collecting supplemental reading on the parol evidence rule for my spring class in Contracts, I’ve once again happened-upon the following statement Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Investments, 834 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). Though we attempt to focus this blog’s discussion on recent developments and pending cases, we’ve decided to direct attention to its statement on the nature of legal opinions:
To answer these two questions, we, in Missouri, no different than the courts in most other jurisdictions, have used a variety of principles, chosen randomly with no consistency, from the common law, the treatises of Professor Williston and Corbin, and the First and Second Restatement of the Law of Contracts. The principles developed within each source may well be consistent with one another. The principles of one source, however, are not necessarily consistent with the principles of another source. Thus, the random selection of principles from more than one source to resolve parol evidence issues has made the parol evidence rule in Missouri, no different than in most other jurisdictions, a deceptive maze rather than a workable rule. We do not intend to solve this maze and tidy up the Missouri law. We follow the holdings and teachings of our cases as we understand them.
Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Investments, 834 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).